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THE EFFECT OF ALTERATION OR ABOLITION
OF A MUNICIPAL CORPORATION
UPON ITS DEBTS
BY JOHN DONALD ROBB*
N a number of cases which have been decided by the Supreme
Court of the United States the question which was raised was
-what happens to debts owed by a muncipal corporation to a pri-
vate person, when the state abolishes or alters the municipal cor-
poration without making provision for the payment of its debt? In
Laramie County v. Albany County,' the state legislature had
carved the defendant county out of the plaintiff county without
making any provision for the apportionment of the debt. Suit
was brought to compel contribution by Albany County, but the
court held that the entire burden must fall upon the parent county.
In the case of Mount Pleasant v. Beckwit7, 2 however, where the
legislature abolished a municipal corporation and divided its terri-
tory among three others without providing for any apportionment
of the debt, the court apportioned the debt, and allowed a bond-
holder of the extinct municipality to bring suit against one of
its successors, on the ground that, unless the legislature intended
the debt to be apportioned, the obligation of the plaintiff's contract
would be impaired, and the court would so construe the legislative
act as to uphold its constitutionality.
There is a respectable amount of opinion to the effect that the
two cases are irreconcilable and that the former is the correct
view. It is argued that in the Laramie Case the value of the
bonds was lessened by cutting down the size of the county which
was responsible for payment of the debt, and hence if there were
no impairment of the obligation of contracts in that case, there
would be none in the Mount Pleasant Case. But, it is said, the
parties must have contracted with a view to the law, and therefore
one of the terms of the contract was that if the state exercised
its sovereign power of altering or abolishing the debtor corpora-
tion without apportioning the debt among its successors, the debt
*Member of the Bar of the City of New York.
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should as to that successor be invalid. Therefore, there is no im-
pairment of contract in either case and the court is free to construe
the statute without a slant. Construing the statute thus we should
reach in both cases the result of the Laramie Case.
The argument thus advanced, however, is open to the criticism
that it assumes a term of the contract which is purely fictitious,
and the interpretation of a contract is a process in which we should
stick to facts. There is -a great danger in adjusting the facts so
that we may reason from the premise thus derived to a pre-
conceived result. The data of a judicial decision should be deter-
mined accurately before it is attempted to reason therefrom.
There can be little doubt that the contracts in question were upon
their faces unconditional contracts by the city to pay back to the
plaintiff the money borrowed. There is no express qualification
to the effect that the contract should be subject to the right of the
state to destroy the debtor. And it is rather difficult to conceive
of parties entering into a contract with such an understanding.
The analogy which is drawn between the Laramie Case and the
Mount Pleasant Case seems to be unsound. It is submitted that
there is no real antagonism between the two cases, for in the
former the parent municipal corporation was well able to pay
the entire debt, while in the latter the debtor municipal corporation
was entirely destroyed. In the former the obligation of the con-
tract persists unimpaired, only the security being weakened. In
the latter the contract itself is impaired, is in fact destroyed when
the obligor is destroyed without provision for a successor. This
distinction may perhaps be better brought out by a consideration
of the case of Brewis v. City of Duluth.3 In that case the debtor
municipal corporation was not destroyed, but the larger part of
its assets was transferred by legislative act to another municipal
corporation, and it was left for the time without the ability to
pay its debt. This is then a middle case, a substantial impairment
of the obligation of the contract, whereas the Laraie Case in-
volves only an immaterial impairment of the security (the debt
being left intact) and the Mount Pleasant Case involves the total
impairment of the obligation of the contract.
If then these two premises are sound, namely, that there is
a contract absolute in its terms and an impairment of the obliga-
tion of such contract, the legislative act is within the literal word-
ing of the prohibition in article I, sec. 10, par. 1, of the consti-
tution of the United States.
3(1881) 3 McCrary (U.S.C.C.) 219, 9 Fed. 747.
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At this point we are met by a very pertinent consideration.
In order to recover on such an evidence of indebtedness, the
bondholder would have to recover a judgment against the city,
and then mandamus the collection of necessary taxes, if the
municipality proved refractory and refused to levy the taxes.4
If the tax commissioners then resigned one could only go into
equity and have a receiver appointed to collect the taxes. But, in
Meriwether v. Garrett,5 the Supreme Court has held that the col-
lection of taxes by such a receiver was unconstitutional, as a
usurpation by the courts of legislative power.
It is quite evident then that, if the above line of argument
is to be followed, the contract clause must be read as referring
only to a certain class of contracts, namely, those which can be
enforced by the courts without usurping legislative powers. This
seems to be the correct approach, logically; and the further ques-
tion now arises whether in its practical results the latter approach
is preferable to the former, that is, whether it is not better to say
that there is a contract and that its obligation is impaired, and
then to consider whether such a contract comes within the pro-
tection of the contract clause, than to say that one of the terms
of the contract envisages its destruction by the act of one of
the parties and that therefore its obligation is not impaired.
By the former view the contract includes an implied agree-
ment that the state may destroy the municipal corporation at any
time and thus repudiate its debt. Consequently, if the legislature
destroys the municipal corporation there is no remedy for the
creditor. By the latter view there is a contract enforceable in
spite of the destruction of the municipal corporation, by means
of a judgment, an apportionment by the court, and a writ of
mandamus directed to municipal officials of the succeeding muni-
cipal corporation ordering the collection of such taxes as had
already been provided for the payment of these obligations. The
remedy of the creditor is only limited by the constitutional in-
ability of the courts to exercise legislative power. That this
is the line along which the problem is being worked out by the
Supreme Court there is evidence in the decision of Mobile v.
Watson.' In that case the city of Mobile was authorized to issue
bonds, and did so, providing at the same time for a special tax
4Heine v. Levee Commissioners, (1873) 19 Wall. (U.S.) 655, 22 L. Ed.
223.
5(1880) 102 U.S. 472, 26 L. Ed. 197.
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to be levied annually to take care of the payments of principal
and interest as they became due. The city of Mobile was later
dissolved by the state legislature and the port of Mobile was
incorporated to take over most of its assets. Upon suit by one
of the bondholders the court decreed that the officers of the port
of Mobile should assess, levy and collect the special tax provided
for by the legislature. The legislative power had already been
exercised so that the court had merely to order certain executive
acts.
It seems, therefore, that the ends of justice, as well as logical
coherence, can better be attained by applying to these cases
the view that there is a contract, valid insofar as it can be
enforced by the courts without usurping legislative power, than
by applying the theory that one of the terms of the contract is
that it shall cease to be of binding force if the state legislature
sees fit to destroy or partially destroy a municipal corporation.
